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REVISITING THE RATIONALITY
ASSUMPTION OF DISCLOSURE LAWS:
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Uri Benoliel*
Jenny Buchan**
Tony Gutentag***

I.

INTRODUCTION

Disclosure laws are one of the most common types of regulation in
American law. These laws normally require the "discloser" to give the
"disclosee" a pre-contractual disclosure which includes information
about the potential risks associated with a product or service provided by
the discloser.2 Disclosure laws cover a wide range of products
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1. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Futility of Cost-Benefit Analysis in
Financial Disclosure Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S253, S257 (2014) ("Mandated disclosure is
one of the most common regulatory techniques in American law."); Matthew A. Edwards, The
Virtue of Mandatory Disclosure, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 47, 47 (2014)
("During the past fifty years mandatory disclosure has emerged as a dominant method of legal
regulation in the United States."); Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and
Restaurant Grading, 122 YALE L.J. 574, 577 (2012) ("[D]isclosure is a mainstay of the regulatory
toolkit...."); see also MARY GRAHAM, INFORMATION AS RISK REGULATION: LESSONS FROM
EXPERIENCE 3-4 (2001); Erin Bernstein, The Upside of Abortion Disclosure Laws, 24 STAN. L.
POL'Y REV. 171, 190-97 (2013) ("Indeed, disclosure laws are commonplace .... "): Paula 1. Dalley,
The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1089, 1092-93
(2007) ("There are dozens, possibly hundreds, of regulatory schemes that use disclosure in whole or
in part to accomplish their purposes."); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and

InformationalStanding: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 618-25 (1999).
2.

Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA.

L. REV. 647, 681-85 (2011).
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and services such as mortgages, houses, mutual funds, health,
and franchises:
Given the broad coverage of disclosure laws, it is not surprising that
they have sparked years of ongoing and intense debate and controversy.
Proponents of disclosure laws believe that these laws allow disclosees to
be well-informed and consider the contractual risks before purchasing a
product or service: By considering the disclosed risks, disclosees can
choose safer goods and services. This support for disclosure laws is
backed by one central implicit theoretical assumption that underlines
these laws: that disclosees are, by their very nature, rational actors who
are likely to read and analyze the risks disclosed before making a
decision that involves risks.

3.

SeeinfraPartII.

4.

See,

e.g.,

OREN

BAR-GILL,

SEDUCTION

BY CONTRACT:

LAW,

ECONOMICS,

AND

PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 105-11 (2012); OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER,
MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 21-23 (2014);
ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 7-11, 12-

&

13 tbl.1.1, 14-15, 24-25 (2007); Oren Bar-Gill, Defending (Smart) Disclosure:A Comment on More
Than You Wanted to Know, 11 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 75, 77-82 (2015); Ben-Shahar
Schneider, supra note 2, at 681-702; Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at S257-63: Allen
Ferrell, Mandatory Disclosure and Stock Returns: Evidence from the Over-the-Counter Market, 36
J. LEGAL STUD. 213, 216-22, 228, 230-37 (2007); Allen Ferrell, Measuringthe Effects of Mandated
Disclosure, I BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 369, 374-78 (2004); Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty.
Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosurein Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers, 19
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 45. 55-59 (2003); Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory

Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 845-55 (2006); Ho,
supra note 1. at 588-95; Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency
Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1070-84, 1090-93 (1995); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does
Contract Disclosure Matter?, 168 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 94, 97-101 (2012);
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the Recommendations of
the ALI's "Principlesof the Law of Software Contracts", 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 169-73, 182-85
(2011); Alan D. Mathios, The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws on Product Choices: An
Analysis of the Salad DressingMarket, 43 J.L. & ECON. 651, 660, 672, 674-75 (2000); William M.
Sage, Regulating Through Information:DisclosureLaws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1701, 1715-36, 1746-52 (1999).
5. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 198, 199 & 199 n.164 ("[T]he theory underlying the regulatory
technique of mandatory disclosures presupposes that people make better decisions for themselves
when well-informed than anyone can make for them."); see Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 2,
at 681-82 & n.178 ("[Mandated disclosure] supposes that people make better decisions for
themselves than anyone can make for them and that people are entitled to freedom in making
decisions."); Y. Angela Lam, Note, The Gift That Keeps on Taking: How Federal Banking Laws
Prevent States from Enforcing Gift Card Laws, 93 MINN. L. REV. 311, 336-37 (2008)
("Consumer advocates have long argued for more disclosure, based on the idea that a well-informed
consumer will be better able to consider the risks . . before purchasing a product."). For other
potential benefits of disclosure laws see THOMAS A. DURKIN & GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN, TRUTH IN
LENDING: THEORY, HISTORY, AND A WAY FORWARD 171-72, 173-74 tbl.7.1,175-79 (2011).
6. FUNG ET AL., supra note 4, at 6-7.
7. See infra Part IL
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This dominant assumption that underlines disclosure laws, namely
that disclosees are rational actors, has already been questioned by
opponents of disclosure laws. In particular, those opposed to disclosure
laws theoretically argued that disclosees suffer from one serious
cognitive constraint: bounded rationality.' More specifically, a typical
disclosee is boundedly rational, and is therefore cognitively incapable of
reading and analyzing disclosures, which are normally too complex and
ubiquitous.In the same vein as existing theoretical behavioral criticism on
disclosure laws, this Article empirically shows, for the first time, that
disclosees may suffer from another serious cognitive limitation apart
from bounded rationality: unrealistic optimism about disclosed risks.''
Focusing as a case study on franchisees, who are often perceived as
sophisticated and rational disclosees,," this Article empirically shows that
8. Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory ofDisclosure Regulation and Other Costs of
Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 508-09 & n.154 (2007) ("A related criticism of expansive
disclosure regulations is that users of information (including regulators as well as investors) are
constrained-boundedly rational-in their ability to know what information is useful to them and
how to use the information they receive to make optimal decisions."); Susanna Kim Ripken, The
Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to
Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 187 nn.184-86, 188 (2006) ("No matter how much
we do to make disclosure more meaningful and accessible to investors, it will still be difficult for
people to overcome their bounded rationality."); Lauren E. Willis, Performance-BasedConsumer

Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309, 1321, 1323-24 (2015) ("Scholars and regulators have generally
attributed discloser's failures to bounded consumer rationality .... ).
9. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1477-78 (1998) (noting that bounded rationality refers to the fact that human cognitive
abilities are limited). Specifically, "[people] have limited computational skills and seriously flawed
memories." Id. at 1477; see also HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 198 (1957).
10. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at S258-59 ("[D]isclosers pile so much
information on readers that they cannot possibly cope with the burden of understanding and
analyzing what they have read. These problems are intensified by the fact that people are often not
literate enough, or schooled enough in the complexities of quite specialized decisions, to use the
information profitably.").

11.

See infra Part III.B-D.

12.

See Mary deLeo, Emasculating Goliath: Did Postal Instant Press v. Sealy Strike an Unfair

Blow at the FranchisingIndustry?, 25 W. ST. U. L. REV. 117, 171 (1997) ("[T]oday's franchisees
are more savvy, more educated, more likely to come from a business background and therefore
more likely to be experienced in assessing risks and making informed decisions accordingly.");
Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a Flight from Arbitration?, 37 HoFsTRA
L. REV. 71, 87 (2008) ("[F]ranchisees are business people, and at least some franchisees are very
sophisticated business people .... ); Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001
U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 766 ("[F]ranchisees are much closer to the sophisticated, well-informed
individual . . than are consumers or employees..."); Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by
Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 257 (1993) (stating that in franchise contracts "the price is set in each
case by negotiations among sophisticated and knowledgeable parties"); see also Broussard v.

Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 348 (4th Cir. 1998) ("By all lights, Meineke
franchisees are independent, sophisticated, if sometimes small, businessmen who dealt with
Meineke at arms' length and pursued their own business interests."): Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v.
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franchisees are, by their very nature, cognitively biased., More
concretely, the evidence presented in this Article strongly indicates that
franchisees are unrealistically optimistic about the major risks disclosed
under the federal franchise disclosure rule that governs the significant
franchise industry.,
The broad potential implications of our empirical results are
twofold: first, the assumption that disclosees are rational is dubious, and
second, disclosees, being unrealistically optimistic about disclosed risks,
may discount risk-related information disclosed under disclosure laws.
Our results hence cast significant doubts over the effectiveness of
disclosure laws in protecting disclosees from prospective hazards.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides context by
reviewing the underlining major implicit assumption of disclosure laws,
namely that disclosees are rational actors.: Part III presents data and
discuss the methodology for empirically testing our hypothesis whereby
franchisees, the focus of our empirical case study, are unrealistically
optimistic about disclosed risks.:, Part IV discusses the normative
implications of the empirical results.,
II.

DISCLOSURE LAWS' RATIONALITY ASSUMPTION

One central goal of disclosure laws is to allow disclosees to assess
the expected risks of a decision before making one.- For example, the
Jabush, 89 F.3d 109. 113 (2d Cir. 1996) ("As purchasers of a Subway sandwich franchise, the
Spearses '[were] not vulnerable consumers or helpless workers. They 1were] business people who
bought a franchise."' (quoting Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley

Cookies, Ltd.. 970 F.2d 273, 281 (7th Cir. 1992))); OrigiinalGreat 4n. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co.,
.

970 F.2d at 281 ("The Sigels are not vulnerable consumers or helpless workers. They are business
people who bought a franchise . .
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part II.

16.
17.

See infra Part III.
See infra Part lV.

18.

See. e.g., Lead: Proposed Requirements for Disclosure of Information Concerning Lead-

Based Paint in Housing, 59 Fed. Reg. 54,984, 54,986 (Nov. 2, 1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 745)
("The purpose of this proposed rule is to ensure that families are aware of . . . the hazards of
exposure to lead-based paint."); Diane Thompson, Know Before You Owe: New
Mortgage Disclosures, New Rule, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU
(Oct. 5, 2015).
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/know-before-you-owe-new-mortgage-disclosures-new-rule
("This rule is a part of our Bureau-wide Know Before You Owe mortgage initiative. We are
working to make the . . . risks of financial products and services clearer, so you can make better,
more informed decisions."); Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Improves Disclosure for
Mutual Fund Investors (Nov. 19, 2008). https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-275.htm
("'Today's action will help mutual fund investors more easily obtain the key information they need
- such as the description of the fund's investment objectives and . . . risks . . .' said SEC Chairman
Christopher Cox.").
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purpose of the "Know Before You Owe" mortgage disclosure rule is to
help consumers understand the key risks of the mortgage loan for which
they are applying. For that purpose, lenders must disclose the loan's key
risks, such as payment penalties or increases to the mortgage loan
balance. Likewise, the purpose of the "Lead Disclosure Rule" is to
ensure that home purchasers are aware of the risks of exposure to leadbased paint before buying an apartment. Accordingly, the Lead
Dislcosure Rule requires sellers to provide purchasers with a federally
approved lead hazard information pamphlet.22 Similarly, the purpose of
the Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC") Mutual Fund
Disclosure policy is to help mutual fund investors more easily obtain key
information about mutual fund risks: Accordingly, each fund must
disclose the principal risks of investing in the fund, "including the risks
to which the Fund's portfolio as a whole is subject and the circumstances
reasonably likely to affect adversely the Fund's net asset value, yield,
and total return." Similarly, pre-abortion disclosure laws require
physicians to inform women of the health risks associated with abortion
and childbirth before performing an abortion, in order to allow women to
assess these risks.
Another major example of a disclosure law that aims to allow
disclosees to assess the expected risks of their decision, and on which
this Article is focused, is the "Federal Franchise Rule."- One of the

&

19. Thompson, supra note 18.
20. What Is a Loan Estimate?. CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Sept. 12, 2017),
("The lender must
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/1995/what-is-a-loan-estimate.htm
provide you a Loan Estimate within three business days of receiving your application.... [Tihe
form indicates if the loan has special features that you will want to be aware of, like penalties for
paying off the loan early (a prepayment penalty) or increases to the mortgage loan balance even if
payments are made on time (negative amortization).").
21. Lead; Proposed Requirements for Disclosure of Information Concerning Lead-Based
Paint in Housing, 59 Fed. Reg. at 54,986.
22. 24 C.F.R. § 35.88(a)(1) (2017) ("The seller or lessor shall provide the purchaser or lessee
with an EPA-approved lead hazard information pamphlet.").
23. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 18; Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec.
Exch. Comm'n, Statement by SEC Chairman: Enhanced Disclosure for Mutual Fund Investors
(Nov. 19, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch Ill 908cc.htm.
24. Final Rule: Registration Form Used by Open-End Management Investment Companies:
Sample Form and Instructions, SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/337512f.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2017).
25. See generally Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTFMACHER INST..
(last
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/counseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion
updated Jan. 1. 2018) (noting that twenty-six states require information about the risks of abortion
and twenty-nine states require information about risky developments during pregnancy).
26. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.3(e)(4) (2016); Franchise Rule, FED. TRADE COMM'N,
https://wvww.ftc.gov/enforcement/rules/rulemaking-regulatory-reform-proceedings/franchise-rule
(last visited Feb. 15, 2018). This Article refers to the FTC's Federal Franchise Rule as the
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Rule's goals is to allow prospective franchisees to assess the risk that
their potential franchisor will terminate their franchise contract
opportunistically. The risk of opportunistic termination can take one of
two central forms: (1) franchisors may terminate the contract of an
efficient franchisee, who fully complies with the contract, solely for the
purpose of selling the latter's profitable unit to a new franchisee for
higher franchise fees;r or (2) a franchisor may terminate the contract of
an efficient franchisee simply to manage the successful unit himself.2
In order to allow potential franchisees to assess the prospective risk
of opportunistic termination by their franchisor, the Franchise Rule
requires each franchisor to disclose the following information through a
pre-contractual disclosure document entitled Franchise Disclosure
Document ("FDD"). First, the franchisor must summarize the conditions
under which it may terminate the franchise contract. Specifically, if the
franchisor has a right to terminate the contract at-will, it must disclose
this right in a specified tabular format.' Second, the franchisor must
disclose the history of civil litigations within the franchise system." This
information is intended to alert potential franchisees that a franchise
system has been plagued by lawsuits of opportunistic termination
practices.- Third, the FDD must disclose the annual number of
by the franchisor without
previously terminated
franchisees
compensation. Fourth, the franchisor must disclose the contact
information of former franchisees terminated by the franchisor.- This

"Franchise Rule" or the "Rule."
27. Neptune T.V. & Appliance Serv., Inc. v. Litton Microwave Cooking Prods. Div., Litton

Sys., Inc., 462 A.2d 595, 601 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983); ROGER D. BLAIR & FRANCINE
LAFONTAINE, THE ECONOMICS OF FRANCHISING 271, 273 (2005).
28. See BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note 27, at 271; Michael J. Lockerby, Franchise
Termination Restrictions:A Guide for Practitionersand Policy Makers, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 791,
834 & n.144, 835 (1985); Mark Pruitt, Disclosure and Good Cause Legislation: "Where's the Beef'

in FranchiseRegulation?, 90 COM. L. 563, 565 & n.31 (1985): Boyd Allan Byers, Note, Making a
Case for Federal Regulation of FranchiseTerminations-A Return-of-Equity Approach, 19 J. CORP.
L. 607, 621 & n.88 (1994); David Hess, Comment, The Iowa FranchiseAct: Towards Protecting
ReasonableExpectations of Franchiseesand Franchisors, 80 IOWA L. REV. 333, 334 & n.7 (1995);
Tracey A. Nicastro, Note, How the Cookie Crumbles: The Good Cause Requirement for

Terminatinga FranchiseAgreement, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 785, 801-02 (1994).
29. 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(q) & item 17 tbl.
30. Id.
31. Id. 436.5(c)(1)(i)(A), (iii)(B), (3).
32. Charles S. Hale, II, Note, Market Impact in the Information Age: ProtectingHotel Owners
from Hotel Management Companies, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 573, 581 (2005) ("The most effective part
of the disclosure laws are the requirements that franchisors disclose information regarding the
history of criminal and civil litigation within the franchise system, alerting potential franchisees that
a franchise system has been plagued with complaints of abusive practices.").

33. 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(t)(2)(ii)(E) & item 20 tbl.3.
34. Id. § 436.5(t)(5).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol46/iss2/5
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information is intended to allow prospective franchisees to investigate
the causes of previous franchisee terminations, and use it to assess the
prospective risks of future opportunistic termination by the franchisor.A seminal implicit assumption that underlines disclosure lawswhich aim to allow disclosees to assess the expected risks of their
decision-is that disclosees are inherently rational.' More specifically,
disclosure laws assume that disclosees, as rational actors, are likely to
read the risk-related information disclosed, systematically assess the
disclosed risks, and freely choose whether to take these risks based on
their internal risk preferences. For example, in the context of the
Franchise Rule, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") explains, that
the Franchise Rule is based on the theory that an informed franchisee
"can determine whether a franchise deal is in his or her best interest."Moreover, the Bureau of Consumer Protection at the FTC explains that
the Franchise Rule is "a cost-effective way to provide material
information
to prospective
franchisees
so they can assess
the . .. potential financial risks involved in entering into a franchise
relationship."- Given the assumption that franchisees can rationally
35. Mario Herman, Don't Be a Victim of Franchise Fraud, aka, Churning - Understanding
Item 20 Part 2, FRANCHISE KNOW How, http://www.franchiseknowhow.com/legal-corner/
churning2.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2018) ("[A] careful review of Item 20 [of the Franchise Rule]
can disclose some red flags which might help to prevent you from falling victim to
franchise . . churning. Is there a high turnover rate? What are the reasons for the turnover rate?"):
see STATE OF CAL. DEP'T OF Bus. OVERSIGHT, LOOK BEFORE You LEAP: A GUIDE TO BUYING A
FRANCHISE 5, 7 (2015), http://www.dbo.ca.gov/forms/doc/DBO-SRD%20QR%2051/8%2OLook%
20Before%2OYou%20Leap.pdf ("Question[] to ask a former franchisee: If there was a termination
or non-renewal, did the franchisor explain why . . . .").
36. See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis. Decisionmakingand the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of

PredatoryLending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 712, 741-48 (2006) ("Current federal law governing
home lending requires that borrowers be given an avalanche of disclosures .... The law is premised
).
on a largely unbounded rational actor model of borrower decisionmaking . .
37. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 2, at 727-28 ("Mandated disclosure
assumes that people want to make decisions themselves and want to do so by gathering and
evaluating information about their choices."); Steven W. Bender, Consumer Protection for Latinos:

Overcoming Language Fraudand English-Only in the Marketplace, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1027, 1075
(1996) ("Disclosure laws assume that consumers will read the information disclosed....");
Marc I. Steinberg & Lee E. Michaels, Disclosure in Global Securities Offerings: Analysis of
JurisdictionalApproaches, Commonality and Reciprocity, 20 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 207, 210 (1999)
("The theory of disclosure assumes that if the business and financial condition of an enterprise are
adequately and accurately disclosed in a publicly available document, then an investor can make an
informed determination regarding whether to engage in the prospective transaction."); Willis, supra
note 36, at 712 ("The law ... assumes that borrowers will take the disclosures and freely choose a
loan available in the market according to the borrower's own internal price and risk preferences.").

38. Franchise Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,294, 57,294 (Oct. 22, 1999) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt.
436).
39. BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., FED. TRADE COMM'N, DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND
PROHIBITIONS CONCERNING FRANCHISING: STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
AND PROPOSED REVISED TRADE REGULATION RULE (16 CFR PART 436), at 6 (2004),
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assess the franchise risks, the FTC's long-held conclusion is that
"informed [franchisee] choice is the best regulator of the market."III.

THE EMPIRICAL TEST: ARE FRANCHISEES RATIONAL?

A.

The FranchiseIndustry: A Brief Overview

&

The franchise industry plays a vital role in the U.S. economy. It
incorporates around 782,000 establishments. These establishments, in
turn, provide approximately 8.8 million jobs. Furthermore, they produce
goods and services worth about $890 billion annually, and contribute
approximately $520 billion to the gross domestic product.- Franchise
businesses cross more than 300 business lines.- These business lines can
be categorized into ten major areas: "Automotive, Business Services,
Commercial & Residential Services, Lodging, Personal Services, Quick
Service Restaurants, Real Estate, Retail Food, Retail Products
Services and Table/Full Service Restaurants."
As stated above, the franchise industry is governed by a federal
disclosure law commonly known as the Franchise Rule.- The Rule was
enacted by the FTC,- an agency that aims to enhance informed consumer
choice.- The Rule requires each franchisor to provide potential
franchisees with a FDD containing "information about the offered
The FDD is
franchise, its officers, and its franchisees."4

http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/staff-report-bureau-consumer-protectionfederal-trade-commission-and-proposed-revised-trade/0408franchiserulerpt.pdf.

40.

Id. at 11.

41. See IHS ECONOMICS, FRANCHISE BUSINESS ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR 2015.
at 5 n.2, 8 tbl. (2015), https://www.franchise.org/sites/default/files/Franchise-BusinessOutlookSeptember_2015.pdf ("An establishment is a single physical location at which business is conducted
or services or industrial operations are performed. . . . An establishment may be owned by the
franchisor or the franchisee.").

42.
43.
44.

Id. at 8 tbl.
Id.
Franchise Businesses to Continue Growth Trend in 2016, Outpacing Economy-Wide

Pace, INT'L FRANCHISE ASS'N (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.franchise.org/franchise-businesses-tocontinue-growth-trend-in-2016-outpacing-economy-wide-pace.

45.
46.

Id.
See 16 C.F.R.

§ 436

(2007).

47. The Franchise Rule went into effect in 1979 and was amended in 2007. FED. TRADE
COMM'N, FRANCHISE RULE COMPLIANCE GUIDE, at i (2008), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/plain-language/bus70-franchise-rule-compliance-guide.pdf.
48. About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM'N. https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited Feb. 15,

2018).
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/rules/
49. Franchise Rule, FED. TRADE COMM'N,
rulemaking-regulatory-reform-proceedings/franchise-rule (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).
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intended to allow potential franchisees to assess the expected risks of the
offered franchise before making a purchasing decision:
B.

The TheoreticalHypothesis

Our hypothesis is that the rationality assumption that underlines the
Franchise Rule is false. Particularly, we predict that franchisees are
unrealistically optimistic about the specific risks that are disclosed in the
FDD, as required by the Franchise Rule. Our hypothesis is based on
existing empirical studies, which show that people, in various aspects of
life, are unrealistically optimistic about general future risks. Unrealistic
optimism is broadly defined as the tendency of an individual to think
that misfortunes will happen to the other, and not to oneself.' The
concept of unrealistic optimism was first introduced in 1980' and has
since been documented in over one thousand studies.:
For example, individuals are unrealistically optimistic about their
chances of suffering health problems, such as heart attacks or arthritis.Smokers are unrealistically optimistic about their risk of lung cancer,
heart disease, and emphysema.- Individuals are unrealistically optimistic
regarding their likelihood of contracting HIV.- Women are
unrealistically optimistic about their risk of getting breast cancer." Men
are unrealistically optimistic about their risk of getting prostate cancer.

&

&

50. Id.
51. See intra notes 55-71 and accompanying text.
52. Neil D. Weinstein, UnrealisticOptimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY
SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 806 (1980).
53. See id.
54. James A. Shepperd et al., A Primeron UnrealisticOptimism, 24 CURRENT DIRECTIONS
PSYCHOL. So. 232. 232 (2015).
55. Christopher Peterson & Mechele E. De Avila, Optimistic Explanatory Style and the
Perception of Health Problems, 51 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 128, 130, 131 tbl.1 (1995); see Vera
Hoorens & Bram P. Buunk, Social Comparison of Health Risks: Locus of Control, the PersonPositivity Bias, and UnrealisticOptimism, 23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 291, 298 (1993).
56. Tracy Williams & Valerie A. Clarke, Optimistic Bias in Beliefs About Smoking, 49
AUSTL. J. PSYCHOL. 106, 110 tbl.3, III (1997); see N.D. Weinstein et al., Smokers' Unrealistic
Optimism About Their Risk. 14 TOBACCO CONTROL 55, 58-59 (2005).
57. See, e.g., van der Pligt et al., Perceived Risk of AIDS: Unrealistic Optimism and SelfProtective Action, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF HIV INFECTION 39, 42-45 (John B. Pryor
Glenn D. Reeder eds., 1993): MEG GERRARD, ANTECEDENTS OF PREGNANCY AND PREGNANCY

&

ATTRITION IN FIRST TERM WOMEN MARINES 55-56 (1989); R S Gold, Explaining Gay Men's
UnrealisticOptimism About Becoming Infected with HIV, 15 INT'L J. STD & AIDS 99, 101 (2004);
Shelley E. Taylor et al., Optimism, Coping, PsychologicalDistress, and High-Risk Sexual Behavior
Among Men at Risk for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 63 J. PERSONALITY
SOC. PSYCHOL. 460,469-70 (1992).
58. Valerie A. Clarke et al., UnrealisticOptimism and the Health Belief Model, 23 J. BEHAV.
MED. 367. 371. 372 tbll. 374 (2000).
59. Id. at 373 tbl.IL 374-75.
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Drivers are unrealistically optimistic about their driving risks.'
Motorcyclists are unrealistically optimistic about their risk of being
involved in a serious road accident.- College students are unrealistically
optimistic about their risk of being involved in a traffic accident.:,
College students are optimistically biased about positive life events, such
as liking their post-graduation job or owning their own home.- College
students are also unrealistically optimistic about negative life events,
such as having a drinking problem or being fired from a job.- Individuals
are unrealistically optimistic about their risk of committing suicide or
becoming addicted to drugs.- Students who experienced an earthquake
are unrealistically optimistic, a couple of months after the earthquake,
about their risk of being hurt in a natural disaster.- Novice bungee
jumpers are unrealistically optimistic about their risk of injury:Individuals who had recently applied for a marriage license are
unrealistically optimistic about the longevity of their marriage.Equally, empirical studies consistently show that business people,
although often perceived as more sophisticated than non-business
people," are unrealistically optimistic as well. Entrepreneurs are
unrealistically optimistic about their own odds for business success.'

&

&

60. See Dominique Gosselin et al., Comparative Optimism Among Drivers: An
IntergenerationalPortrait,42 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 734, 737 tbl.2, 738 (2010); see
also Ola Svenson et al., PerceivedDriving Safety and Seatbelt Usage, 17 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
PREVENTION 119. 126, 131 (1985).
61. D. R. Rutter et al., Perceptions of Risk in Motorcyclists: Unrealistic Optimism. Relative
Realism and Predictions ofBehaviour, 89 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 681. 691-92 (1998).
62. David M. Deloy, The Optimism Bias and Traffic Accident Risk Perception, 21 ACCIDENT
ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 333, 334, 338-39 (1989).
63. Weinstein, supra note 52, at 810 tbl.1, 811.
64. Id.
65. Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Health Problems:
Conclusions from a Community- Wide Sample, 10 J. BEHAV. MED. 481, 486 tbl.1, 488 (1987).
66. Jerry M. Burger & Michele L. Palmer, Changes in and Generalization of Unrealistic
Optimism Following Experiences with Stressful Events: Reactions to the 1989 California
Earthquake, 18 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 39,42 tbl.1 (1992).
67. Wendy Middleton et al., Give 'Em Enough Rope: Perception of Health and Safety Risks
in Bungee Jumpers, 15 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 68, 76 tbl.2 (1996).
68. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average:
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage. 17 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 439,
440,445,446 tbl.2 (1993).
69. In the legal context, business people are often perceived as more sophisticated than
members of the general population, such as consumers. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Jabush,
89 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 1996): Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley
Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 281 (7th Cir. 1992); Susan Saab Fortney, Seeking Shelter in the
Minefield of Unintended Consequences - The Traps of Limited Liability Law Firms, 54 WASH.
LEE L. REv. 717, 752 & n.158 (1997); Harry G. Prince, Unconscionabilityin California:A Need for
Restraint and Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 459, 481-82 & nn. 112-17, 501 (1995).
70. Arnold C. Cooper et al., Entrepreneurs' Perceived Chances for Success, 3 J. BUS.
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Similarly, entrepreneurs are unrealistically optimistic about the
probability of their business surviving:
Within the field of franchising-the focus of our empirical case
study-empirical studies indicate that franchisees are also unrealistically
optimistic. For example, franchisees may be unrealistically optimistic
about their potential profits, and the level of training and support
provided by the franchisor.- Similarly, franchisees are unrealistically
optimistic about the number of units they will develop in their territory
within a certain time period." Likewise, franchisees are unrealistically
optimistic about their business capabilities to uncover and
implement their own novel business alternatives, which compete with
the ones provided by their experienced and knowledgeable
franchisor. Correspondingly, franchisees are optimistically biased about
their sales volume.:
Given the empirical evidence that people, including franchisees, are
generally optimistic about the future, we predict that franchisees are
specifically optimistic about the major risks disclosed by operation of
the Franchise Rule.
C. Methodology
1. General
In order to assess whether franchisees are rational or unrealistically
optimistic about risks disclosed under the Franchise Rule, we apply the
"direct method" of analysis,' developed mainly by Professor Neil

&

&

vENTURING 97, 103 tbl.3 (1988).
71. John F. Pinfold, The Expectations of New Business Founders: The New Zealand Case. 39
J. SMALL Bus. MGMT. 279, 280, 281 tbl.1 (200 1).
72. See, e.g., Markus Blut et al., What to Expect After the Honeymoon: Testing a Lifecycle
Theory of Franchise Relationships, 87 J. RETAILING 306, 309-10 (201 1), Marko Grinhagen
Michael J. Dorsch, Does the FranchisorProvide Value to Franchisees? Past, Current, and Future
Value Assessments of Two FranchiseeTypes, 41 J. SMALL Bus. MGMT. 366,376 (2003).
73. Arturs Kalnins, Overestimation and Venture Survival: An Empirical Analysis of
Development Commitments in InternationalMaster Franchising Ventures, 14 J. ECON. & MGMT.
STRATEGY 933, 940-41. 943 tbl.IV, 944, 947-48 (2005).
74. See Sidney G. Winter et al., ReproducingKnowledge: InaccurateReplication and Failure
in Franchise Organizations,23 ORG. Scr. 672, 678 tbl.2, 679-81 (2012).
75. Bernadette H. Schell & Sheila McGillis, How Type A Franchisees Cope with Failed
Business: An Analysis of Micro- and Macro-System Factors, 12 J. SMALL Bus.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 27, 36 (1995).
76. Adam J. L. Harris & Ulrike Hahn, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events: A
CautionaryNote, 118 PSYCHOL. REV. 135, 137 (2011) (explaining what the direct method requires);
James A. Shepperd et al., Taking Stock of Unrealistic Optimism, 8 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SC. 395.
399 (2013).
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Weinstein.7 This method is the most popular empirical method for
assessing unrealistic optimism and has been applied in hundreds of
studies.- Under this method, representative individuals from a group "are
required to make a comparative, quantitative response indicating the
degree to which they are more or less likely to experience [a certain risk]
than the average person.", If the individuals, as a whole, are rational,
their overall mean of comparative risk judgments combined should equal
the "average."- In other words, the average of all individual levels of risk
indicated by the participants should be equal to the average risk in the
group. Conversely, a significant tendency for the individuals' overall
mean to be lower than "average" indicates unrealistic optimism on the
part of the individuals, as a whole, because the mean risk of the group
should be, by definition, "average."- The lower the mean, compared
to the average, the greater the level of unrealistic optimism." To
illustrate, if all individuals claim that their chances of experiencing a
problem are well below average, they clearly demonstrate, as a whole,
unrealistic optimism."
2. Participants
The Franchise Rule obligates every franchise chain to disclose the
contact information of its current franchisees." Since we decided, for
logistical reasons, to conduct an email survey rather than a phone
survey, we located all the franchise chains in the representative
EntrepreneurMagazine's dataset" that disclose their franchisees' email
77. See Harris & Hahn, supra note 76, at 137. Professor Neil D. Weinstein is a Distinguished
Professor Emeritus at the Rutgers School of Environmental and Biological Sciences.
Deptment of Human Ecology: Faculty, RUTGERS SCH. OF ENVTL. & BIOLOGICAL SCIs.,
http://ihumanecology.rutgers.edu/faculty.asp?fid=4() (last visited Feb. 15, 2018). He has written
several classic papers on unrealistic optimism. See. e.g.. Weinstein. supra note 52: Neil D.
Weinstein, UnrealisticOptimism About Susceptibility to Health Problems. 5 J. BEHAV. MED. 441
(1982): Weinstein, supra note 65.
78. Harris & Hahn, supra note 76 (stating that the direct method is "[tihe most popular
measure for assessing unrealistic optimism"); Shepperd et al., supra note 76 ("Most unrealistic
optimism studies-hundreds of them-have examined unrealistic comparative optimism using the
direct approach.").
79. Harris & Hahn, supra note 76 (noting the direct method is "[t]he most popular measure for
assessing unrealistic optimism"): see Shepperd et al., supra note 76.
80. See Harris & Hahn, supra note 76.
81. Weinstein, supra note 65. at 488-89.

82. Id. at 488.
83.

See id.

84.

16 C.F.R. § 436.5(t)(4) (2007).

85. Previous studies have estimated that Entrepreneur Magazine's dataset is representative of
the population of franchisors operating in the United States. See. e.g., Scott Shane & Maw-Der Foo,
New Firm Survival: InstitutionalExplanations for New FranchisorMortality, 45 MGMT. SC. 142,
146 (1999); Scott Shane et al., The Effects of New FranchisorPartnering Strategies on Franchise
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addresses in their FDD, as opposed to their phone numbers. This process
led to a sample of 1741 franchisees from twenty-six different franchise
chains. These chains are from heterogeneous business lines such as real
estate, business services, health care, maintenance, education, vending,
fitness, shipping, children's products and services, and fast food.
Out of 1741 email addresses, 118 were invalid. Of the emails sent
to valid addresses, 878 were opened by the franchisees. We believe that
unopened emails sent to valid addresses were sent to recipients' spam
folders or were suspected as spain. Of the 878 emails that were
opened, 205 franchisees (23.3%) filled out the research questionnaire.
Franchisees who chose to participate in the study did so voluntarily,
without any monetary or other compensation.
Table I summarizes the franchisees' ages.- The ages ranged
between 20 to 61 years and above: 2% of the franchisees in the sample
were 20 to 30 years of age, 12.3% were 31 to 40, 23.0% were 41 to 50,
34.8% were 51 to 60, and 27.9% were 61 and over. The majority of the
sample, 85.7%, were over 41 years of age.
Table 1. Franchisees'Ages
Age

Percentage

20-30

2%

31 -40

12.3%

41 -50

23%

51 -60

34.8%

61 +

27.9%

Table 2 summarizes the franchisees' experience in the franchise
industry.- The experience ranged between less than 1 year to 16 years
and above: 29.2% had 0 to 2 years of experience, 32.5% had 3 to 5

System Size, 52 MGMT. SC. 773, 778 (2006).
86. The sample chains were Amazing Athletes, American Poolplayers Association, Bevintel,
Bricks 4 Kidz, Dryer Vent Wizard, East Coast Wings, Happy & Healthy Products, HomeVestors,
HUMAN Healthy Vending, InXpress, KidzArt, Massage Heights, Menchie's, Molly Maid, Mr.
Handyman, National Property Inspections, PostNet, Pro Martial Arts, Right at Home, SpeedPro,
Steamatic. TGA Premier Youth Tennis, The Alternative Board, The Woodhouse Day Spa, Tippi
Toes Dance, Wild Bird Unlimited, and Zoom Room.
87. See infra Part III.C tbll.
88.

See infra Part III.C tbl.2.
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years, 18.9% had 6 to 10 years, 10.2% had 11 to 15 years, and 9.2% had
16 years of experience or more. More than half of the sample, 61.7%,
had up to 5 years of experience.
Table 2. Franchisees'Experience
Experience (Years)

Percentage
29.2%

3 - 5

32.5%

6-10

18.9%

11 -15

10.2%

16+

9.2%

Table 3 summarizes the number of franchise units owned by each
franchisee.- This number ranged from one unit to five units or more:
79.1% had only one franchise unit, 15,0% had two units, 1.5% had three
units, 1.0% had four units, and 3.4% had five units or above. The vast
majority of franchisees had only one franchise unit.
Table 3. Number of Franchise Units Owned by Each Franchisee
Units

Percentage
79,1%

2

15%

3________

1.5%T

41%
5+

3.4%

3. Instruments
A questionnaire comprising five items was developed specifically
for this study. Two items were used to assess unrealistic optimism by
asking the franchisees to assess two potential risks addressed in the
FDD, as provided to each franchisee under the Franchise Rule. More
89.

See infra Part III.C tbl.3.
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specifically, franchisees were asked to assess the likelihood-compared
to other franchisees in their chain and state-that their franchisor might
terminate a franchise unit that they own in order to resell it to someone
else. Franchisees were also asked to assess the comparative likelihood
that their franchisor might terminate a franchise unit that they own in
order to operate it directly. Franchisees were asked to respond
using a seven point Likert scale: much below average, below average, a
little below average, average for a franchisee in my chain and state, a
little above average, above average, and much above average.
When analyzing the data, the seven possible responses were
assigned numerical values ranging from (-3) to (+3) ("much below
average" to "much above average," respectively). This response scale is
typically used in studies that empirically investigate the incidence of
unrealistic optimism."
The remaining three items in the questionnaire were demographic
questions: franchisees were asked to report their age ("How old are
you?'), years of experience in the franchise industry ("How many years
in total have you been a franchisee?'), and number of units owned
("How many franchise units do you own?').
4. Procedure
Franchisees were sent an email asking them to volunteer to
participate in a study concerning franchisees' perceptions of specific
business risks. The email contained a hyperlink navigating participants
to an online version of the research questionnaire. Franchisees who did
not complete the questionnaire received a reminder to participate in the
study six days later.
D. Results
1. General
Table 4 presents the distribution of franchisee responses in
percentages, as well as the mean and standard deviation, regarding their
franchisor's intentions to resell the franchisee's unit or operate the
unit directly. As evident from the data concerning both potential risks,
most of the franchisees believe that the likelihood of either scenario is
much below average or below average.

90. See. e.g., Harris & Hahn, supra note 76, at 138 ("[T]he response scale typically used in
this paradigm is a seven point scale from -3 (chances much less than the average person's) to +3
(chances much greater than the average person's) .....
91. See infra Part ILI.D tbl.4.
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Table 4. FranchiseeAssessment of Franchisor'sIntentions

Much below average
Below average
A little below average
Average
A little above average
Above average
Much above average
Mean
Standard Deviation

Franchisee assessment of franchisor's
intentions to:
Operate the unit
directly (%)
Resell the unit (%)
78.9
63.4
10.8
16.6
2.5
2.5
7.3
4.4
2.4
3.4
0.0
2.4
1.0
4.4
-2.55
-2.04
1.07
1.66

2. Evidence of Unrealistic Optimism
The unrealistic optimism hypothesis was tested, namely, whether
franchisees exhibit overconfidence in their judgments. If the
comparative risk judgments in franchise businesses are unbiased, then
the mean judgment will be zero for each risk. A mean less than zero
indicates an optimistic bias, that is, a tendency to claim that one's risk is
less than the risk of others (i.e., the average risk). Thus, the mean
comparative risk judgment is a measure of unrealistic optimism: the
more negative the mean, the greater the bias.
A one sample t-test of the hypothesis that the mean is different
from zero revealed a significant unrealistic optimism bias, in each of the
two risks: (1) the likelihood attributed by franchisees to the risk that their
franchisor might terminate a franchise unit they own in order to resell it
to someone else was significantly lower than zero, i.e. the average (M =
-2.04, SD = 1.66: t [204] = -17.62, p < .001, d = 1.23); with a large
effect size; and (2) in addition, the likelihood attributed by franchisees to
the risk that their franchisor might terminate a franchise unit they own in
order to operate the unit directly was significantly lower than zero, i.e.
the average, as well (M = -2.55, SD = 1.07; t [204]= -33.95, p <.001, d
= 2.38); with a large effect size. It is apparent that franchisees display a
significant optimistic bias with respect to the two risks included
in this study.
3. Unrealistic Optimism and Demographics
The franchisees' assessment of their franchisors' intentions to resell
their unit was found to be uncorrelated with age (r = -. 03, p = .635) or
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years of experience (r = -.04, p = .581). However, it was found to be
correlated with the number of franchises owned (r = .16, p = .019); with
a small effect size. That is, the more franchises a franchisee owns, the
greater her assessment that her franchisor intends to resell a franchise
unit that she owns.
The franchisees' assessment of their franchisors' intentions to
operate the unit directly was found to be uncorrelated with years of
experience (r = -.08, p = .284) or number of franchises owned (r = -.01,
p = .959). However, it was found to be correlated with age (r = -. 14, p =
.044); with a small effect size. That is, the younger the franchisee,
the greater her assessment that her franchisor intends to operate the
unit directly.
The franchisees' assessments of their franchisors' intentions to
either resell the unit or operate the unit directly were found to be
correlated with one another (r = .63, p < .001); with a large effect size.
That is, the less a franchisee believes that her franchisor intends to resell
her unit, the less she believes that her franchisor intends to operate the
unit directly.
Age was correlated to years of experience (r = .40, p < .001);
with a medium effect size. That is, the older a franchisee, the more
years of experience she tends to have. The number of franchises
owned was uncorrelated to age (r = -.05, p = .490); or years of
experience (r = .04, p = .553).
4. Two Risk Comparison
Although, as reported earlier, the relationship between the two
items assessing overconfidence-the franchisees' assessment that their
franchisor intends to resell their unit or operate the unit directly-was
found to be significant with a large effect size (r = .63, p < .001), we
wanted to compare the two items to see if franchisees showed greater
optimism bias with respect to one risk over the other. To this end, we
applied a paired samples t-test. We found the franchisees'
overconfidence that their franchisors intend to operate the unit directly
(M = -2.55, SD = 1.07) was significantly higher than their
overconfidence that franchisors intend to resell the unit (M = -2.04, SD
= 1.66; t [203] = 5.45, p <.001, d = 0.38); with a small effect size. That
is, optimism bias was greater for franchisor intentions to operate the unit
directly than for franchisor intentions to resell the unit, although the
difference was small.
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DISCUSSION AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS

Our empirical study reveals that franchisees, often perceived as
sophisticated and rational disclosees,- are inherently biased concerning
disclosed risks. This discovery casts significant doubts over the
underlining implicit assumption of the federal franchise disclosure rule,
namely that franchisees are rational actors.In addition, our results, which show that franchisees are cognitively
biased, question the effectiveness of the Federal Franchise Disclosure
Rule.- More specifically, franchisees, being overly optimistic about
disclosed risks, may simply avoid risk-related disclosure information
that might contradict their optimistic beliefs.' "If [disclosees] perceive
that particular negative events are less likely to happen to them then it is
possible that they will pay less attention to risk-related [disclosure]
information . . . ."- Disclosees who are unrealistically optimistic about
their own abilities may not pay much attention to disclosure risk
information, which they may feel is mainly directed at other less careful
or less skillful individuals than themselves.Indeed, empirical studies systematically show that people who are
optimistically biased about their risks are less likely to seek information
about those risks. For example, an empirical study by Anh, Park, and
Haley examined the relationship between consumers' optimism bias and
their inclination to read mandated legal disclosures.- By analyzing the
survey data of 404 consumers, the study reveals that unrealistically
optimistic consumers are less likely to pay attention to the mandated
legal disclosure on the health risks of drugs, which is required by the

92.
93.
94.
Peter H.

See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.A-B.
Others have criticized the effectiveness of the SEC's mandatory disclosure. See. e.g..
Huang, Regulating IrrationalExuberance and Anxiety in Securities Markets, in THE LAW

AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 501, 523 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds.,

2005) ("Mandatory disclosure might be at best, an impotent and, at worst, a socially harmful
regulatory policy if the majority of investors experience cognitive biases . . . .").
95. See, e.g., Deborah J. Wiebe & David Black, Illusional Beliefs in the Context of Risky
Sexual Behaviors, 27 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1727, 1728-29 (1997).
96. See, e.g., Frank P. McKenna, It Won't Happen to Me: UnrealisticOptimism or Illusion of
Control? 84 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 39,44 (1993).

97. See, e.g., Marleen Decruyenaere et al., Adolescents' Opinions About Genetic Risk
Information, Prenatal Diagnosis, and Pregnancy Termination, 32 J. MED. GENETICS 799, 803-04
(1995); Ripken, supra note 8, at 167; Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. CHI.
L. REV. 249, 260-61 (2006).
98. Ho-Young (Anthony) Ahn et al., Consumers' Optimism Bias and Responses to Risk
Disclosures in Direct-to-Consumer(DTC) PrescriptionDrug Advertising: The Moderating Role of
Subjective HealthLiteracy, 48 J. CONSUMER AFF. 175, 178-79 (2014).
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Food and Drug Administration: The study further shows that
unrealistically optimistic consumers are less likely to seek additional
information about a drug's health risks through alternative sources.- In
the same vein, an empirical study by Park, Ju, and Kim reveals that
as consumers are more optimistically biased about the future risk of
depression, they are less likely to seek information about this
health problem.
Likewise, in an experimental study conducted by Fowler and Geers,
undergraduate students who were unrealistically optimistic about their
health conditions were less likely than other subjects to seek health
information by attending informative seminars."- In the same vein, in an
empirical study conducted by Radcliffe and Klein, subjects were given
an opportunity to read about one heart attack risk factor out of the
following six factors: alcohol consumption, fat consumption, nutrition,
smoking, exercise, and stress.- The study shows that subjects who were
unrealistically optimistic about their risk of heart attack chose to read
about a risk factor toward which they believed they possessed a
favorable standing, and chose not to read about risk factors toward
which they possessed a less favorable standing.-,
Likewise, according to an empirical study conducted by Lu, Dzwo,
Hou, and Andrews,- subjects who were optimistically biased about the
risks of eating food cooked by arsenic-contaminated oil were less intent
on seeking information regarding those risks." Similarly, in an
experimental study conducted by Wiebe and Black, subjects received an
informative pamphlet containing information about contraception, "as
well as the specific advantages and disadvantages of several different
contraceptives."-- Prior to reading the pamphlet, the optimistically-

99. Id. at 182, 185-86.
100. Id. at 186.
101. Jin Seong Park et al., Direct-to-ConsumerAntidepressant Advertising and Consumers'
Optimistic Bias About the Future Risk of Depression: The Moderating Role of Advertising
Skepticism, 29 HEALTH COMM. 586, 589, 590. 591 tbl.1, 592 (2014).
102. Stephanie L. Fowler & Andrew L. Geers, Dispositional and Comparative Optimism
Interact to Predict A voidance of a Looming Health Threat, 30 PSYCHOL. & HEALTH 456, 461-65

(2015).
103. Nathan M. Radcliffe & William M. P. Klein, Dispositional, Unrealistic,and Comparative
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biased subjects reported lower interest in the pamphlet than did the
more realistic subjects.-,
V.

CONCLUSION

A seminal assumption that underlies current disclosure laws is that
disclosees are intrinsically rational. As such, disclosees are presumed to
be able to rationally assess the risks involved in contracts and avoid
those risks. Based on this rationality assumption, current disclosure laws
are predominantly based on rules, which aim to provide disclosees with
information regarding future risks. Equipped with this information,
disclosees, as rational actors, are assumed to be capable of protecting
themselves against future contractual risks.
This Article questions the validity of the assumption that disclosees
are rational actors. As the empirical study in this Article shows,
franchisees, despite being business people who make large investments
in the franchise, suffer from an inherent cognitive constraint known as
unrealistic optimism. Due to them being overly optimistic about the
future, it is expected that franchisees would systematically discount riskrelated information disclosed under disclosure laws.
The broad potential implications of our empirical results are that
other disclosees, less sophisticated than franchisees, are also likely to be
unrealistically optimistic about disclosed risks. Our results, hence, cast
significant doubts over the effectiveness of disclosure laws in protecting
disclosees from prospective hazards.

108.

Id. at 1744.
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